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in the USSR and the Soviet Zone of
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Attached is a paper concerning developments in the Soviet Union and the Soviet Zone of Germany since Stalin's death.

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Development of the Political Situation in the USSR and the Soviet
Zone of Germany since Stalin's Death

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1. Soviet Union

The remarkably speedy and up to now more or less frictionless, completed reorganization of the Soviet leadership has, on the whole, confirmed interpretation that while on the one hand hasty speculations regarding system toppling conflicts among the potential heirs to Stalin's authority would be unfounded, on the other hand, however, the new masters of the Kremlin would appreciate a certain relaxation of foreign relations during the period necessary to establish their authority.

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- a) Despite the continuity of the internal balance of power, which must be credited without a doubt, to the determined and capable Malenkov, there have been since Stalin's death a series of decisive changes and indications of internal jockeying within the Soviet leadership. The causes and effects of these changes and indications of internal jockeying cannot as yet be sufficiently appraised and therefore require undivided vigilance.

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The old Politburo was for all purposes except in name recreated by the numerical reduction and new appointments of members to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR. This in effect nullified one of the most important organizational changes brought about by the 19th party congress. One of the many results of this change was that the younger members who had advanced to the fore because of their professional qualifications rather than as a result of a party career were forced out of recently earned positions in the party leadership. The subsequent numerical reduction of the Secretariat of the Central Committee from 10 to 5 members and the transferral of the direction of the Secretariat to Malenkov

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continue in the direction of the reaffirmation of the position of the party hierarchy in relation to the state bureaucracy within which Stalin, breaking with Lenin's tradition, deposited increasingly the power of government.

The establishment of the many technical ministries in the state apparatus in 1949 was to a great extent nullified and ^{this} as a result reaffirmed the position of the individual department representative. Special attention must be paid to the consolidation of the MVD and MGB under the control of Beriya. Parallel to the reduction in the membership of the supreme party organ, the membership of the Presidium of the Ministerial Council ^u was reduced to the actually responsible individuals. In the capacity of an economic and trade expert Mikoyan was appointed "Deputy Minister President" to the four earlier appointed "First Deputy Minister Presidents," Beriya, Bulganin, Molotov and Kaganovich.

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By and large it is to be noted that in contrast to Stalin's tactics, after ~~his~~ death the "unavoidable participants in the business of government" were no longer merely representative of their executive function while actually well removed from the positions for which they were responsible, ^{but} _^ are instead fully burdened with the responsibilities of their respective areas and take their place in the leadership group in relation to their effective strength. As a result of this and to avoid the rather unhealthy climate which at first faced any personal dictatorship, a closely knit ~~but~~, considering the various power elements included, well-balanced, bureaucratic - collective form of government was realized.

The changes listed here, which reduced considerably the autocracy of the "Chief" who at the top echelon united party and state, should not at this time be construed as concessions from Malenkov to the power of his rivals. The changes should instead be interpreted as indications of the method which Malenkov is using to stabilize his instrument of government, conscious of his goal and fully aware that the authority wielded by him is infinitely smaller than that of Stalin. Just how far this stabilization of his power, which is to be attained through organizational means, will be successful for any length of time and to what extent a synthesis ^{has} _^ of existing factors: party, state, army and security service, ~~can~~ be organized on a collective basis, without the incontestable superiority of a one-man dictatorship, remains to be seen.

Various incidents have in the meantime raised doubts about Malenkov's unequivocal superiority and the internal unity of the leading group. They ^{have} indicated at least that the expected consolidation process is not by any means completed.

The surprising and for the internal prestige of the Kremlin damaging revelations of the Doctors' case have been subjected to the most contradictory interpretations. They are without a doubt not expressions

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of any basic changes on the part of the Kremlin, but rather indications of a shift of power following Stalin's death; a shift of power possibly not in favor of Malenkov. Even though foreign policy considerations may have played a decisive role in these changes (rectification of the anti-semitic, that is anti-Zionist campaign, which was unwise from a foreign policy point of view-- a rectification which was emphasized heavily by the public warnings against any type of racial hatred issued by the Minister of Justice) the respective incidents could not be sufficiently clarified. ~~It is~~ Whether or not the sudden death of one of the doctors who after the purge of the doctors in the Kre lin, was one of the cosigners of Stalin's post-mortem examination report, had anything to do with the ~~unfathomable~~ turn of events is doubtful, but nevertheless possible.

Despite the fact that the relegation of the leadership of the Secretariat to Khrushchev was made when Malenkov assumed power, it can hardly be construed as intending only to relieve Malenkov by an individual totally loyal to him and therefor cannot be considered as strengthening his overall position. It is more likely that after Stalin's death the leading forces of the party once again became aware of their power and consequently demanded their own representation of their interests. Some conclusions regarding this problem may be drawn from the latest developments in Czechoslovakia: The conformance of the Czechoslovak government structure to the Moscow structure following Gottwald's death, the circumstances of which having not as yet been fully clarified, did not leave the leadership of the Secretariat in the hands of Gottwald's successor in contrast to the former organization of the top echelon, and analogous to the corresponding change in Moscow. Instead the political importance of the First Secretary of the Central Committee (Novotny) increased remarkably.

Recent Pravda statements regarding the advantages of the collective leadership over the one-man dictatorship (which certainly did not originate from Malenkov's own decision), statements which hitherto had been unthinkable shed a significant light on the internal development in the Soviet Union.

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Add to ~~all~~ ^{state} this the indications of domestic propaganda, which in the ~~the~~ ^{state} Soviet ~~Union~~ is unquestionably a sign of weakness (amnesty proclamations, ^{pharisee} new ~~emergence~~ basic democratic rights, improvement of the living conditions of the civilian class) and the observations of ~~the~~ ^{far-spread} ~~continued~~ lack of direction and ^{of} insecurity of the Satellite governments and the ~~common~~ ^{headquarters} offices of the Western communist parties. (Compare, for example, the action of the Swedish communist party which at its recent ~~congress~~ ⁱⁿ yearly congress made some changes ~~of~~ the Central Committee, and in announcing a new party program ^{of} changed to a "peoples front policy" in cooperation with the left wing of the Social Democrats),

Particular attention in this connection ~~deserves~~ ^{deserve} the recent changes in the Georgian, Latvian and ~~Belorussian~~ ^{Belorussian} Republics. On the one hand, the nationality problem, which during times of strong central power lies dormant beneath the surface, may have become acute once again in view of the ~~lack~~ ^{of} absence of ~~established~~ ^{consolidated} power ⁱⁿ of the Kremlin; ^(this is true) Particularly in those areas which have ^{ve} always been regarded as ~~unstable~~ ^{unstable} and therefore particularly receptive to Western propaganda. On the other hand the ~~proceedings~~ ^{se developments} could also be the direct expression of existing opposing factions in Moscow. The changes in Georgia, particularly the nominations ^{of} of Dekanosov, a loyal follower and protege of Beriya, as Georgian Minister of Security, are definite indications of a growth of Beriya's power. ^{position had heretofore} The latter ~~has not been~~ ^{clarified} ~~definitely known~~ since the confusing case of the Kremlin doctors.

~~However,~~ ^{it} is notable that in the purge of the Kremlin doctors before Stalin's death as well as in the change which took place in ~~Tbilisi~~ ^{Tbilisi} in the previous year the action was directed against Beriya and ^{now} in both ~~these~~ instances a complete 180 degree reversal took place, ~~and~~ which caused the downfall of Malenkov's protégé, Ignatyev. Since the latest government changes Radio ~~Moscow~~ ^{Moscow} has been praising Beriya ~~and has been speaking of him~~ as the "Favorite Son of Georgia!"

Finally it must be pointed out that according to certain indications there is very little probability that the army has definitely decided to support Malenkov. Speaking for the ^{continued} relatively great power of Molotov is the fact that foreign affairs ^{continue to} ~~seem to support his position as before~~ and operate in important positions, with Molotov's proteges Malik and Gromyko, while P.F. Judin, recently sent to Germany is a supporter of the present party leadership.

The indications given here, which show that the uniformity of the Moscow Central Administration has obviously not yet been achieved, cannot give impetus, as previously stated, to hasty speculations ^{on} upheaving internal conflicts. Not the system of government, but rather the relationship of the individual power factors to each other and the superiority of one of the other is at this time the problem.

The present over-all picture and reference points available up to date do not permit an appraisal to be made whether or not Malenkov will succeed by clever maneuvering to consolidate and entrench his position, and which power combinations are to be dealt with. It is probable that during the consolidation phase the unanimous tendency, to discard dead wood from the foreign policy and if possible also from the internal policy area, will remain. Notwithstanding the ~~possibility~~ possibly resulting appearance of a political change, the fact remains that a real peace policy under present world conditions requires a long breathing spell and internal strength. The possibility of serious internal conflict among the participants of the highest leading powers of the Soviet Union must be regarded by the West, at this time, not as an advantage, but more as a moment of increased danger.

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b) The first indications of the so-called "peace offensive" of the Soviets take place immediately after the change in the Moscow government, in the setting of the ~~late~~ indicated internal situation of the transitional period with as yet uncertain outcome.

In the peace offensive actions of Soviet diplomacy, which are supported by a relatively moderate and factual tenor ~~and~~ Soviet propaganda, the need for easing foreign policy tensions coincides with the intention of cutting the ground, ~~from~~ both politically and psychologically, from under the common armament efforts of the West, particularly from under the efforts aimed at a West European arms community. The breathing spell thus gained is to be used for the purpose of strengthening the USSR's own position. On occasion the East Zone press ~~bluntly~~ ^{plainly} suggested the purpose of this maneuver; it was severely ~~reprimanded~~ ^{reprimanded} for this bluntness. Judging from all available indications there can be no question of a change in the principles of Soviet policies. Open to question are merely the tactical limits up to which one can count on Soviet concessions as part of the Soviet policy of easing the tension.

As early as the first half of April [1953] an impression was gathering strength to the effect that the actions of the Soviet diplomacy with ~~the~~ regard to the Korea question as well as in the field of UN policy had relatively narrow limits, a circumstance which made these manipulations appear in the light of psychological maneuvering for the purpose of improving the over-all [world political] atmosphere. Furthermore, considering the fact that [continued] the existence of the West German state fragment represents the cardinal point of the entire political concept of the West - a situation which was visibly underlined by the visit of the Federal Chancellor to Washington - the opinion gained probability that, basically, the new foreign policy of the USSR, though with farreaching preparation and as a last resort, aims at negotiations concerning the [solution of the] German question. However, in the meantime a number of indications - to which detailed reference is made below - made it very doubtful whether a serious ~~first~~ offer for the solution of the German question was intended, or still is intended. In

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other words, there is a question whether more than a reissue of the old ~~business~~ ^{contradictory} proposal is intended under which, on the one hand, the integration of the Federal Republic with the West is to be prevented by negotiations on reunification and the antagonism of the Western partners of the US fostered in that manner. On the ^{other} hand, the internal political coordination of the Soviet Zone with the Soviet Bloc is pushed ^{to} to strengthen the basis for Soviet infiltration of all of Germany).

In the meantime Moscow's reaction to Eisenhower's speech, as stated in the 25 April 1953 issues of Izvestiya and Pravda, strengthened the view that the Kremlin will not have anything to do with a comprehensive settlement of questions in dispute, such as was outlined by Eisenhower, but rather intends to take up individual problems and to initiate piece-meal negotiations. ~~Through this~~ ~~process~~ The Kremlin might also expect to find a friendly reception for this proposal in London, which Moscow is courting with all its might, at the present time. The farreaching receptiveness of the French attitude to Soviet enticements is clear to everyone. However, by and large, the outline of the old Stalin line is again becoming more clearly visible with the one difference of a considerably more moderate ~~mode~~ mode of expression (compare the ~~xx~~ Soviet utterances on the Eisenhower speech, Voroshilov's words when Bohlen presented his credentials, the 1 May 1953 speeches, and the most recent Pravda article by Ilya Ehrenburg).

The known contradiction in Stalin's foreign policies is demonstrated in the Far East as well as in Europe: The problem of an armistice in Korea is barely kept going - not in the least as a favor to Red China. However, a comprehensive settlement of the East Asiatic problems is consciously blocked by the proposal of a five-power pact. Meanwhile, the hot war in Indochina is actively pushed.

The German problem continues to be submitted as a promising topic for negotiations although the questions raised in this connection by Eisenhower are unmistakably excluded [from consideration]. Yet the suggestions made up to this time for all practical purposes do not go any further than the most recent Soviet note on Germany. At the same time the process of Sovietization of the Soviet Zone is continued with renewed vigor.

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The change in diplomatic appointments (exchange of Gromyko and Malik on the one hand and ~~Semenov~~ ^{Semenov} and ~~Yudin~~ ^{Yudin} on the other hand), which has just taken place for political reasons, according to all indications, and not as a matter of routine, cannot be interpreted with absolute certainty with regard to the questions raised above. ^{Gromyko's} ~~Gromyko's~~ recall for consultative duties in the Soviet central administration might indicate that the decisive move concerning negotiations on the German problem is yet to come, after it was noted that Moscow [..... apparently part of sentence omitted here], particularly in conversations with London on air ~~safety~~ safety questions [concerning air corridor connecting the West Germany with the Western Sectors of Berlin ?], and Gromyko might have had an important part in the diplomatic preparations for this move. The change from ~~Semenov~~ ^{Semenov}, a man with a reputation for being relatively flexible, to P.F. Yudin, the doctrinaire Cominform politician known from the time ^{before} of Tito's defection from Moscow, ~~it~~ does not indicate a ~~basic~~ basic change in Soviet policies concerning Germany; it might even point to an intensification of the course pursued so far. The appointment of ~~Semenov~~ ^{Semenov} and Pushkin to the ^{Collegium} ~~staff~~ of the Soviet ~~Foreign~~ Ministry/at any rate indicates the strong interest of the Kremlin in the German question.

The appointment of the former Soviet Minister of Agriculture, I.A. Benediktov, who was left without a ministry after the consolidation of the Ministry of Agriculture with the Ministry of Agricultural Procurement, ~~is~~ as the new Soviet ambassador to India again calls attention to the fact that India has for some time been subjected to a lively courtship by the USSR. The appointment of a specialist on questions of vital importance to India, and accordingly of decisive importance in the shaping of India's foreign relations, is another step in Moscow's courting of India.

2. The Soviet Zone of Germany

Since the death of Stalin

The political situation of the Soviet Zone of Germany was governed by conditions of ~~general~~ general insecurity and the twilight of an uncertain expectation of new directives from Moscow. In the meantime the sovietization

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program was pushed even farther, stepped-up fight against the churches; further collectivization of agriculture with only slight restrictions in view of the refugee movement and the intention of infiltrating the rural population with class-conscious industrial workers; proceeding against lawyers up till now admitted to practice and appointment of so-called people's lawyers [Volksanwälte]; discrimination against large numbers of people engaged in "free professions" and against the bourgeoisie in the allocation of foodstuffs; Leipzig trials of private entrepreneurs; announcement of new comprehensive purges and structural changes in the SED [German Socialist Unity Party] leadership for the purpose of complete adaptation to the Communist Party of the USSR; strengthening of the national armed forces; changes in the ministerial apparatus in accordance with the Soviet example; nationalization of the ADN [German General News Agency], etc.). ~~The stopping of certain measures~~ The sovietization program was continued at first hesitatingly but in the end with hardly diminished vehemence, however with scrupulous avoidance of all measures and utterances which might have reference to the change of government in Moscow ~~xxxx~~ or which might ^{be predicted} ~~predict~~ a change ~~in~~ in the political course. The stopping of certain measures prepared before Stalin's death (blockade of Berlin, postponement of the political show trials, legalization of the armed forces) and countermanding of measures offensive to the West (normalizing of relations with the Jews, as it can also be observed in Hungary, temporary moderation or restriction of the propaganda offensive against the US -- not against the Adenauer government!), ~~in~~ all these measures undoubtedly served the purpose of easing the tension within the framework of the new foreign policy tendencies of the USSR.

Recently the darkness in which the ~~xxxx~~ SED and the Pankow government ~~xxxxx~~ have been groping seems to have ^{been removed} ~~changed~~. Since the absence of appropriate directives up till now, to the extent observed, cannot be sufficiently explained by technical difficulties resulting from the change of leadership in Moscow, the idea cannot be completely rejected that this last turn of events resulted from a change in the inner power realities in Moscow.

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The text of the appeal of the [Soviet Zone] People's Chamber to the British House of Commons for one thing, even more the article by Ulbricht on the policies of the Soviet Zone, the declaration concerning the activation of the work of the "National Front" or of the German Rally, and the SED theses for 1 May 1953, [all these policy statements] seem to stick remarkably close to the old propaganda phrases and are getting considerably more vehement in the propaganda language they use. Incidentally, ~~the tenor of the Soviet Zone state-~~ments] is very much in contrast to the utterances coming from Moscow. Since such a change is hardly initiated without the approval of the Kremlin, the chances for a factual release of the Soviet Zone [by the USSR] (reunification of Germany in freedom) cannot be rated low enough. Particularly the fact of the growing national forces as well as the continually increasing investments in the Soviet Zone, and further Soviet plans in the economic field speak an unmistakable language against reunification. As mentioned above, the choice of P. F. Yudin as Semenov's successor makes very unlikely any moderation - not to speak of scrapping - of the sovietization program carried out up till now, regardless of any moves for negotiations which may be forthcoming.

In conclusion the following may be said:

The foreign policy behavior of the USSR, which seems to be conciliatory on a broad front and which appears to invite individual negotiations, is a pursued by conscious and farreaching operation within the framework of the aims of the Soviet foreign policy up till now. For the improvement of the entire political atmosphere, and also not in the least in the interest of Red China (within the limits of the USSR's own need for easing of the political tension), the new gained contacts in Korea will be expanded step by step, ~~to start with~~ up to the conclusion of an armistice. In Europe, despite further attempts to start conversations with the Western Powers, the Kremlin will on the whole stick to its existing sovietization policy in the Satellites, particularly in the Soviet Zone of Germany. It will try to widen the existing rift among the Western Powers and to gain the upper hand in psychological warfare.

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